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POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND REGIME
SURVIVAL IN EGYPT
By Curtis R. Ryan*
Given the chronic instability that characterizes much of the Middle
East and the "Third World", it is puzzling that Egypt has seen few changes of
government since the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy of King Farouk. Egypt
has maintained and developed essentially the same state structure since 1952,
with only two changes of chief executive—and these transfers of power came
about not as a result of a coup or revolution, but only upon the death of the
incumbent president.' In a country whose economic indicators seem constantly
to point to imminent crises or even collapse, Egypt's apparent stability in gov-
ernment appears just as constantly to defy the odds.2
This paper explores the unusual durability of republican Egypt's execu-
tive leadership by examining the strategies of survival employed by its three
presidential regimes, that of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar al-
Sadat (1970-1981), and Husni Mubarak (for the period 1981 to 2000).3 The
paper compares the survival strategies of each of these three Egyptian govern-
ments over time, and identifies consistent strategic patterns, grouped here under
the concepts of containment, repression, and external diversion.'^ In examining
these strategic and tactical patterns of behavior, the purpose of the study is not
only to shed light on politics and development in Egypt, but also to investigate
strategies of government survival which may be generalizable to other develop-
ing states.5
It is worth noting, however, that these three strategies do not exhaust
the list of variables explaining regime survival. Other key issues include, for
example, the question of the regime's performance in office. But a truly compre-
hensive study is beyond the scope of this or any single article, and I will there-
fore focus not on the more positive issue of regime performance, but on what
amounts to the darker and more cynical side of politics—not because it provides
the only explanation, but simply because it is an under explored yet critical
issue in Egyptian and Third World politics.
*Curtis R. Ryan teaches in the Department of Political Science and Interna-
tional Affairs, at Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, VA 22401-5358.
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As this Study will demonstrate, stability and government survival in
Egypt have been achieved more through short term survival strategies than
through success in long term development planning. The implications of this are
important not only for understanding government stability and survival in Egypt
and elsewhere in the Third World, but also for understanding the limiting effect
survival strategies have on otherwise ambitious plans for development and
change. Lacking well-developed institutions with which to effect their plans for
economic and social change, leaders in the Third World often focus on strate-
gies aimed at a more immediate concern: their own political survival. Yet the
very "success" of these survival strategies may undermine any efforts to estab-
lish institutions capable of building for the future, and just as importantly, may
sow the seeds for the growth and perpetuation of security-states, with corre-
spondingly limited potential for political liberalization or democratization in
developing countries.
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES
Studies of political development have devoted considerable attention to
the role of the state as an autonomous force in its own right.^ However, this con-
cept often obscures the tremendous amount of political activity and maneuver-
ing taking place within the state. This paper shall focus, therefore, on the more
specific institution of the presidency itself, that is, the executive leadership of
the state. "The state", however, includes not only this executive but also inter
alia bureaucracies, legislatures, judiciaries, public sector industries, and the mil-
itary. As this paper will make clear, strategies of political survival involve not
only maneuvers in relation to key groups in society, but also in relation to these
other state institutions.
The focus on presidential leadership is necessitated by the nature of
the executive-centered Egyptian political system and will facilitate generaliza-
tion to other developing nations whose political systems are similarly character-
ized by centralized and virtually autocratic rule—including both military
regimes and single-party dominant systems. In the Egyptian context, the dura-
bility and survivability of the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes benefitted
from the uninterrupted historical development of a centralized bureaucratic sys-
tem.^ Each regime, therefore, was able to build upon what Hudson has referred
to as a "historical pattern of autocracy and bureaucratic control."^ And although
many variables may help to explain the longevity of an executive's tenure, in
Egypt or elsewhere, this study will focus on some of the variables that can be
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deliberately manipulated by political leaders. These strategies of survival can
therefore be seen as independent variables affecting the dependent variable of
government survival. The three major strategies explored in this paper can be
defined as follows:
(1) Containment:
Actions aimed at controlling, absorbing, or deflecting pressures and
demands made on the executive. These actions include coopting key
figures and social groups, preempting the maneuvers of political oppo-
nents, balancing key power centers against one another, and creating
institutions to control—if not mobilize—the population.
(2) Repression:
Actions involving coercion and the use of force against opponents of
the government. Specific tactics may include intimidation through
surveillance of opponents, job dismissals and control of future hirings,
arbitrary arrest, and overt physical violence.
(3) External Diversion:
Actions that aim to turn public attention away from unresolved prob-
lems in the economy and society. These often involve dramatic maneu-
vers in international affairs intended to restore legitimacy or to buy
time, and include both those maneuvers in preemption of, and in
response to, popular dissatisfaction.
In the sections that follow, I will examine each of these strategies in detail by
comparing each regime's use of them and its specific tactical variations upon
them. Of the three survival strategies discussed here, containment subsumes by
far the broadest variety of maneuvers, and it will therefore be necessary to
devote relatively more attention to it than to the other two.
CONTAINMENT
Containment Under Nasser
The essence of Nasser's strategy involved the paradoxical goals of pre-
empting potential opponents and containing social groups, while simultaneously
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emphasizing political mobilization. Nasser emerged as the clear central ruler in
Egypt following the 1952 overthrow of King Farouk and the later successful
showdown with the titular head of the new republic, Muhammad Naguib. By
1954 Naguib was ousted, the monarchy abolished, all political parties dissolved,
and most political institutions of the pre-1952 era either destroyed or in disre-
pute. Nasser understood that lasting social change in Egypt, however, required
not only the eradication of these pre-1952 institutions, but also their replace-
ment with some new forms of mobilization and legitimacy.
Nasser made three attempts at building a nationwide institution for
both preempting popular demands for participation and mobilizing the masses
behind the regime, culminating in the essentially corporatist Arab Socialist
Union (ASU).^ Before the emergence of the ASU, the two earlier attempts at
institution-building included the Liberation Rally (1953-1958) and the National
Union (1958-1961). In the case of both organizations, the goals of preemption
and containment appeared to have been more important than those of mobiliza-
tion and participation. Nasser attempted to move beyond the relative weakness
of the Liberation Rally and the National Union with the construction of the
ASU. The new structure's mission was indeed daunting: to thwart class conflict,
to act as a counterweight to the military, and to mobilize the previously disen-
franchised elements of society.'0 Unlike its predecessors, the ASU was orga-
nized more strictly in the corporatist vein by dividing society into general occu-
pational categories roughly paralleling Nasser's rhetoric of a national alliance of
working forces."" This alliance included workers, peasants, intellectuals, and
the bourgeoisie. The only sector that remained outside the ASU domain was the
military.
The problem of dealing with the military led Nasser beyond this corpo-
ratist containment strategy toward the technique of balancing key centers of
power against one another. For although Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all ruled as
civilians, each had a military background and was acutely aware that the ulti-
mate power center in Egyptian politics remained that of the military. But while
the army had helped make the 1952 coup possible, Nasser wasted little time in
curbing any future threats from this, his own institutional base. He forced retire-
ments of suspect officers and used the power of appointments and patronage.
Nasser then entrusted the armed forces, the most powerful institution in society,
to his closest friend, Abd al-Hakim Amir. This attempt at containing the poten-
tial threat of the military proved eventually to have the exact opposite effect.
Amir enthusiastically pursued his military tasks, building the loyalty of
the armed forces through extensive investments in arms and equipment. Further,
Amir retained control of the promotion lists, using his power to place loyal fol-
lowers in all top positions. The president soon came to fear that his most trusted
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lieutenant was too thorough in his efforts. Rather than helping to curtail the
power of the military. Amir had ensured that both he and the armed forces
would constitute the greatest threat to Nasser's rule. No longer able to deflate
the military itself, Nasser opted instead for the strategy of balancing institutional
threats within the state against one another, a technique which came to
characterize his dealings with all top state institutions. The only institution with
the potential to play this balancing role was the ASU, whose strength Nasser
bolstered in order to make it "a civilian counter to the military.'''^
Ironically, the success of this survival strategy also in turn produced a
new threat—necessitating yet another survival maneuver. The ASU came to be
dominated by a new powerful figure in the person of the regime's top socialist
ideologue, Ali Sabri. As head of the ASU Sabri began asserting direct control
over the labor unions and truly mobilizing the workers. In short, the ASU under
Sabri was soon not merely containing, but also mobilizing, social forces which
Nasser felt might pose threats to his regime. By its very success, the ASU more
than balanced off the military, and became a center of power in its own right. A
more pluralist system might have prevented such preponderances of power, but
in Nasser's Egypt, state power was concentrated in the military, the ASU, and
the presidency itself. With the discrediting of the military following the disas-
trous 1967 war with Israel, the ASU alone rivaled the chief executive, leading
Nasser systematically to curtail and undermine the ASU's power from that point
until his own death in 1970.
Containment Under Sadat
While Nasser's style of containing opponents involved corporatism and
balancing centers of power, Sadat's use of the same general strategy—contain-
ment—was characterized more by preemption, appeals to public legitimation,
and an attempt at "controlled" political liberalization.13 The first of these
maneuvers marked the style of Sadat's rule and emerged soon after he assumed
power, when he already faced numerous threats.
Unlike Ali Sabri or Abd al-Hakim Amir, Sadat had never been a
"power center". He remained unobtrusive even when playing a public role, and
thus never appeared to be a threat to Nasser, i"* Yet now he faced challenges from
a variety of powerful figures, each with an institutional base within the state.
These power centers consisted of the personal fiefdoms of several key
Nasserites: Ali Sabri, who had returned to the ASU; General Muhammad Fawzi
in the armed forces; Sami Sharaf as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs;
and Sha'rawi Gum'ah, Minister of the Interior and thus head of the intelligence
services.'5 At first, the various power centers allowed Sadat the presidency.
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presumably as little more than a figurehead, but they soon began to maneuver
for the real reigns of power.
Sadat's strategy for dealing with this plethora of threats—each of
which appeared to have more power than he—proved to be a cornerstone of his
policies for the next decade: the use of a dramatic and sudden preemptive move.
In what became known as the "Corrective Revolution" of 1971, Sadat purged
each of these key figures and hundreds of their associates from every significant
organization within the state. Having removed the leadership of the military, the
ASU, and the police and security services, Sadat was free to install his own
loyal clients in each organization. Before making his decisive move, however,
Sadat had quietly reached understandings with pivotal leaders in the armed
forces to stay out of the way until the purge was complete.
While still consolidating his power, Sadat initially continued the use of
corporatist structures to contain social groups; but he liberalized these to some
degree by allowing debate within the organizations. At the same time he moved
to erode the power of the overarching ASU as a command center once and for
all, and thus the interest groups previously subsumed under the ASU umbrella
achieved a greater degree of autonomy than they had under Nasser.'^ By 1977,
Sadat had developed enough support to abolish all ASU organizations, to toler-
ate the emergence of political "platforms", and eventually to permit the legal
formation of political parties.
Although Sadat proved adept at the politics of containment through
preemption, he also made frequent recourse to sources of public legitimation for
his policies. This included reliance on an obedient parliament to endorse his
measures, as well as continual use of referendums.^^ In addition, he cultivated
an image of being the "believer president", and had the (government appointed)
Sheikh of al-Azhar issue fatwas (religious rulings) endorsing his various poli-
cies as being in accordance with the Shari'a (Islamic law). Most frequent, how-
ever, was Sadat's use of referendums and plebiscites, either for his own reelec-
tion or to approve a specific government policy. In each case the result was an
inevitable 99% rate of approval which Sadat declared to be a popular mandate
for his actions. Eventually, however, the referendum-strategy lost credibility by
being used far too often.'^
Before turning to political liberalization, Sadat made one major
attempt at balancing his opponents against one another, an attempt that had
drastic consequences in promoting Islamist militancy.l^ Student demonstrations
in 1972 and 1973, which were Marxist and Nasserist in flavor, prompted Sadat
to balance the power of these left-leaning elements that dominated the universi-
ty campuses. In a typically dramatic gesture, he released virtually all members
of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) who had been imprisoned
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under Nasser and encouraged them to resume their propaganda as a counter-
force to the leftists. But when Sadat eventually banned all Marxist and Nasserist
organizations, he had left the Ikhwan and other Islamist groups as the only avail-
able vehicles for opposition. With the Marxists and Nasserists out of the way,
the Islamists came to dominate almost all student associations in Egypt's univer-
sities, and soon set their sights on the Sadat regime.2O
But with the dismantling of central Nasserist organizations such as the
ASU, there remained no real institutional vehicles either for opposition to, or
support for, the government. Sadat attempted to address this institutional vacu-
um by initiating a multi-party system in Egypt. As with Nasser's reliance on
corporatist containment of social forces, Sadat's multi-partyism appeared to be
intended more as an instrument for control of domestic pressures than as an
authentic form of popular participation. Hence, while political parties besides
Sadat's own National Democratic Party (NDP) were allowed to form, they were
sharply curtailed in their efforts to voice real opposition to regime policies.21
Just as the preeminent concern with regime survival had prevented Nasser from
ever permitting true popular mobilization in his socialist program, so Sadat too
preferred the maintenance of an authoritarian structure with some democratic
trappings over tolerance of genuine participation and opposition. Under both
administrations, the great majority of Egyptians remained as "contained"
bystanders to the dramatic political and economic overhauls of their society.
Containment Under Mubarak
It is against this dual heritage of Nasser and Sadat that Mubarak suc-
ceeded to the presidency following Sadat's 1981 assassination. Eschewing dra-
matic and risky gestures, Mubarak instead attempted to establish his legitimacy
and ensure his administration's survival by turning to containment of political
pressures through greater political liberalization, economic reform, and
strengthening the military as the key supporter and guarantor of the regime.
Although Mubarak's Egypt could not be seen as a democracy in the western
sense, the flow of political ideas was more open than it had been under Nasser
or Sadat. Egypt was once again home to the most prolific array of newspapers
and magazines in the Arab world, including publications fi-om many political
opposition groups—even the Islamists.
Egyptians still had no real control over the choice of a chief executive,
but they were able to vote in a series of parliamentary elections. The record here
has been mixed: the elections were neither an outright farce nor were they com-
pletely unmanipulated. Egyptian elections serve as an outlet for political pres-
sures and a forum for opponents to vent their frustrations, but are not permitted
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to threaten the government's tenure. In this way, Mubarak has allowed many
potential opponents to work within the system rather than against it. The strate-
gy achieved several goals: (1) it forced opponents to address real policy issues
rather than simply condemning the government; (2) it brought many opponents
out into the open where they could be clearly identified by the government; and
(3) it gave the Mubarak administration a greater veneer of legitimacy. In sum,
limited democratization allowed the government to contain political forces, and
to divide opponents between moderate reformist and militant revolutionary ten-
dencies. In dealing with the latter group, in particular, the regime made full use
of its coercive and repressive capabilities.
Prior to the 1984 elections, Mubarak's administration passed what one
observer described as "a rather curious new election law," which established a
system of proportional representation. In the Egyptian electoral system, a party
needed 8 per cent of the national vote to qualify for representation in the
Assembly. The 1984 law, however, added the unique twist that if a party failed
to get eight per cent, all its votes were automatically added to those of the win-
ning party—inevitably the ruling National Democratic Party.22 The electoral
law was later changed, and the eight per cent rule abandoned, following a 1990
supreme court decision overturning the results of the 1987 balloting. While the
1984 law had worked in favor of the NDP, it may not have been in its larger
interest since these electoral procedures peripheralized and alienated most oppo-
sition parties, prompting alliances between groups that might otherwise have
countered each other.23 This was illustrated in the successful alliance of the
New Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1984, and the later alliance of the
Socialist Labor Party (SLP), Liberal Socialist Party (LSP) and the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1987.24 While it is admirable that the Mubarak regime posted
the 1984 turnout at its accurate 43%, rather than a Sadat era "100%", voter
enthusiasm remained low.25 The opposition newspaper Al-Ahali even put the
1987 figure at as low as 14% (official estimates put it at 25%).26 Similarly grim
voter turnouts persisted throughout the Nineties.
Beyond attempts at greater political liberalization, and in contrast to
Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak's efforts to ensure his own survival also involved
bringing the military back in. While Sadat made conscious efforts to subordi-
nate the army and demilitarize the state, Mubarak restored its privileged posi-
tion in Egyptian society and welcomed it as a full partner to his regime.2'7 The
military became more deeply engaged in infrastructural development and other
economic projects, allowing Mubarak to sidestep both the Nasserist public sec-
tor bureaucracy and the often-corrupt Sadatist private sector entrepreneurs who
had most benefitted from Sadats Infitah policy.28 The army had, in effect, once
again become the sole guarantor of the regimes survival. This became clear with
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the 1986 riots of police conscripts in the Central Security Forces (CSF), which
required the regime to call on the army to intervene. When order had finally
been restored, 107 people had been killed and 715 wounded.29 The riots made
clear that Egypt's painful socio-economic troubles lay barely below the surface.
They also made clear that the Interior Ministry was unreliable in protecting the
administration—as the CSF fell under its jurisdiction, and thus its own forces
were the source of unrest. In this context the preeminent position of the Egyp-
tian army and Ministry of Defense was made manifest.30
Mubarak attempted to cultivate the military as the most powerful con-
stituency in Egypt, garnering its loyalty through extensive military spending,
pay raises, and benefits. In addition, the military's role in development projects
was aimed not only at economic growth itself, but also at keeping the almost
half a million man force preoccupied.^^ Mubarak's policies thus had the para-
doxical effect of liberalizing civilian domestic politics while also revitalizing the
domestic role of the military.32
REPRESSION
In addition to containment strategies, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak have
all turned to repression in varying degrees throughout their presidencies. Of the
three regimes, the Nasserist state most frequently resorted to repression of polit-
ical dissent, justifying these actions in terms of protecting the gains of the revo-
lution. The latter goal, as in many developing societies, was often sacrificed in
favor of the first. Nasser demanded the power to have complete flexibility and
room for maneuver—a goal that runs counter to the development of any real
popular participation or of effective mass institutions.33 As a result, the
Nasserist strategy in practice tended to be "anti-motivational", relying to a large
extent on fear as a preemptive device to contain threats, and exercising outright
coercion when this failed as a deterrent.3'*
Under Nasser, the interior ministry and its associated intelligence and
security apparatus played a continually decisive role in the maintenance of the
government. As early as 1954, the regime cracked down violently on the Mus-
lim Brotherhood after one of its members attempted to assassinate Nasser. Arbi-
trary arrest remained a standard practice in Nasser's Egypt, in particular against
members of the Ikhwan.^^ Among the more dramatic episodes in this darkest
side of politics, was the repression of a 1965 plot against the regime led by
Islamist philosopher Sayyid Qutb.36 The police roundup resulted in the arrest of
more than 18,000 Islamists with further arrests to follow. One estimate held that
27,000 people had been arrested in a single day.37
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Police surveillance and arbitrary arrest were pervasive features of the
repressive apparatus of the Nasserist state—features which became more preva-
lent as the president's paranoia grew. This is not to suggest that no real chal-
lenges to Nasser's rule existed. To the contrary, these were quite real from both
secular leftist and Islamic rightist quarters. Yet it is equally true that the increas-
ing reliance on the intelligence-security apparatus began to feed on itself, as
Nasser came to be surrounded only by "yes-men" whose importance to the pres-
ident (and consequently their personal power) appeared to be predicated on their
efficiency in continually uncovering plots against Nasser.
When Sadat succeeded Nasser to the presidency, he pledged to destroy
the power networks within the Nasserist state and to bring to an end the most
notorious practices of the Nasserist intelligence apparatus: phone-tapping, tor-
ture, and arbitrary arrests.38 Yet although Sadat had purged the leadership of
both the armed forces and the intelligence services {al-Mukhabarat), these insti-
tutions of coercion remained intact. Yet Sadat had pursued a policy of "relative
demilitarization" compared to the Nasser years, in the hope that a weaker mili-
tary would have a correspondingly reduced power potential within Egyptian
politics.39 Despite these efforts to temper the role of the army, a series of riots in
1977 (against an IMF-sponsored austerity program) provided evidence to the
Sadat government that it still needed a strong military. The armed forces had
proven their loyalty and indispensability twice in the same year: by protecting
the regime and restoring order after the food riots, and through their successful
engagements in a four-day border war with Qadhafi's Libya.'*O Still, with the
exceptions of such overt threats to national and government security, the princi-
pal instrument of coercion for Sadat was not the military, but the police and
intelligence apparatus. The shadow of arbitrary arrest did not hover so constant-
ly in Sadat's Egypt as it had under Nasser, but there were notable exceptions
such as the periods of great civil unrest in 1977 and 1980-81. In these peri-
ods—when the government was fighting for its survival—Sadat's administration
could be as ruthless as Nasser's.*"
This became graphically apparent in the last year of Sadat's life, when
he increasingly lost touch with his own people. The president's minimal toler-
ance for opposition had clearly reached its limit. Secular opponents were calling
for more than cosmetic democratization, others were criticizing the separate
peace with Israel, and militant Islamists were denying the very legitimacy of the
Sadatist regime. In a context of increasing instability and sectarian violence in
Egypt,'*2 Sadat instituted a series of measures to ensure his regime's survival.
Sadat proclaimed himself prime minister as well as president, and used a refer-
endum to permit himself to run for an unlimited number of presidential terms.
To steal the wind from the sails of the Islamists, he also had the Shari'a legally
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adopted as the sole source of legislation.43 Finally, Sadat promulgated his infa-
mous "law of shame", an elastic code that could be used against anyone who
offended "national values".''^
In 1981 Sadat made the last of his dramatic attempts to sweep up all
his enemies before they could act against him. This involved moving simultane-
ously against both Muslim and Coptic militants and activists. Shenouda III,
patriarch of the Coptic church, was removed fi-om his office. Sheikh Kishk, a
populist Islamist preacher of national stature, and Umar Tilmisani, spiritual
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, were both arrested.'*^ Several thousand secu-
lar and religious opponents of the Sadat government were also arrested. In the
context of Sadat's rhetoric about political liberalization these mass arrests were
stunning, and were made even more so when they were followed by a lengthy
televised "diatribe" during which Sadat announced that he had "a list of a fur-
ther 15,000 names.'"*^ its very existence on the line, the Sadat regime employed
all the survival tactics in its arsenal, from preemptive maneuvers to outright
repression and further intimidation. Within less than one month, Khalid Islam-
buli, the brother of one of those arrested, led the group that assassinated Sadat at
a Cairo military parade.
Having sat directly beside President Sadat when he was assassinated,
Husni Mubarak (himself wounded in the attack) was well aware of the potential
threat to his rule posed by revolutionary Islamism. Lacking both the charisma
and nationalist credentials of his predecessors, however, Mubarak's position and
survival appeared to be even more in question than that of Nasser or Sadat had
been. Yet generally speaking, repression under the Mubarak regime was not as
wholesale or indiscriminate as that of its predecessors, but the emergency laws,
introduced in 1981 in response to Sadat's assassination, remained in place into
the later 1990s.'*' These measures were used to justify the Interior Ministry's
continued coercion and repression against alleged Islamist militants.
Government repression, in fact, increased in the 1990s, including raids
on mosques alleged to be the loci of militant activities, resulting often in pitched
street battles and the infrequent application of legal due process to the "mili-
tants". By 1992, the government and militant Islamists were waging virtually an
all out war with each other. By the late 1990s, the Mubarak regime appeared to
believe that it had won the battle with the Islamists, yet major acts of terrorism
continued especially against tourists and tourist sites throughout Egypt. With
this conflict as a pretext, the state began to curtail more and more civil liberties.
But as Eberhard Kienle has convincingly argued, the increasing use of both con-
tainment and repressive measures may have had as much to do with countering
opposition to economic reform as is does with defeating the Islamist
movement.'*^
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EXTERNAL DIVERSION
In addition to attempts to contain or repress political pressures, each
president of republican Egypt has also turned to external affairs in pursuit of
legitimacy and, most importantly, to divert attention from domestic problems.
Foreign policy, in short, has been of paramount importance in Egyptian domes-
tic politics. Such linkages between domestic and international political realms
are natural for governments that equate their own survival with national securi-
ty.'*^ Domestic political pressures can thus easily be treated as national security
crises, and the global stage offers an arena to which governments may divert
domestic attention.
Nasser set the precedent for Egypt's activist foreign policy and exten-
sive involvement in international affairs. While the external focus was in fact in
accordance with Nasser's professed view of Egypt's destiny in world
politics^as the center of the Arab, Islamic, and African worlds—it also served
as a diversionary tactic from domestic socio-economic ills.50 Michael Cooper
has suggested that the combination of weak state institutions and external politi-
cal and economic pressures resulted in a "repeated configuration" in Egyptian
politics requiring such diversions. Cooper identifies a cycle in which contain-
ment and even repression are insufficient to quell popular dissatisfaction when
they remain unlinked to evidence of prosperity, and hence the regime turns to
international affairs for diversions and perhaps even solutions to domestic prob-
lems.51
Nasser's emphasis on pan-Arabism made this an obvious tactic. His
flamboyant international style and adventurism elevated Egypt to the dominant
role in the Arab regional system, and this unleashed a wellspring of national
pride on the part of a nation which for centuries had been under foreign colonial
domination.52 Nasser's foreign policy maneuvers imbued him with a remarkable
amount of domestic popular support. In particular, his emergence as a leader of
the Non-Aligned Movement after the 1955 Bandung Conference, his refusal to
join the Western-oriented Baghdad Pact in favor of "positive neutralism," and
his nationalization of the Suez Canal all marked a distinctive and sovereign road
for Egypt's future, uniting Egyptians behind their president. These early suc-
cesses may have helped Nasser to weather later debacles such as the destruction
of Egyptian forces in the 1967 Six Day War. Indeed, few national leaders could
have carried on after such a devastating defeat.
It was, in fact, through the prominence of international affairs that
Nasser developed his lasting legitimacy among Egyptians and Arabs in gener-
al—a legitimacy so strong that it has long outlived Nasser himself and can be
seen in the numerous "Nasserist" groups in the Arab world today.53 Nasser's
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linkage of domestic and international affairs may have given his regime a cer-
tain strategic flexibility in which the government could attempt to shift public
focus from one arena to another, depending on the political fortunes in each.
In contrast, when Sadat assumed the presidency he lacked the personal
power base and popular legitimacy of Nasser, and the Egyptian state was
increasingly incapable of keeping up with the welfare commitments of Nasser's
socialism. Furthermore, Sadat's effort to tone down the rhetoric of pan-Arabism
initially reduced some of the initial legitimacy he may have enjoyed as an origi-
nal member of the Free Officers Movement. Nevertheless, he remained
undaunted and chose to pursue a deliberately different strategy toward political
and economic policy, and toward building his own government's legitimacy. The
Corrective Revolution helped distance Sadat from the unpopular repressive
excesses of Nasserism, while the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War gave Sadat, in
the words of one observer, a "legitimacy bonanza."54 Due largely to this foreign
policy maneuver, Sadat established for the first time his own legitimacy, in
which he emerged from Nasser's shadow to be hailed as the hero of the crossing
of the Suez canal.
In his emphasis on economic liberalization and development, Sadat
expanded the use of diversion as a strategy to include not only grand gestures on
the world stage, but also manipulation of the unique nature of the Middle East
regional political economy. He made great efforts to improve relations with
Saudi Arabia in order to develop the symbiotic economic link between the two
countries: oil-rich Saudi Arabia exchanged its capital for abundant Egyptian
labor. As a result, Sadat was able to ease the burden of Egypt's increasing popu-
lation and decreasing welfare resources by "defusing political unrest through
emigration of labor."55
While this officially-encouraged movement of a restive labor force to
foreign oil fields helped reduce social pressures, the realities of Sadat's Infitah
policies continued to generate further pressures at home. Although some seg-
ments of society had acquired great wealth under Infitah, many others failed to
reap its rewards. Employees of Egypt's huge public sector, which continued to
employ more Egyptians than any other area, were hard hit by spiraling inflation,
given their fixed incomes. Inequalities increased and class gaps became more
apparent with the conspicuous consumption of the new Infitah capitalists.56 As
noted in the discussion of repression, popular discontent with the government
exploded in 1977 following the implementation of an IMF austerity program.
Rioting and vandalism swept Alexandria and Cairo, prompting Sadat to call in
the army for the first time against Egyptian demonstrators since 1952. After the
army had quelled the unrest with considerable force, Sadat quickly reinstated
subsidies on staple foods and, predictably, held a new referendum to endorse his
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continued rule.'^ In this crisis, however, neither containment nor repression tac-
tics appeared to thwart domestic economic dissatisfaction or political dissent.
Drawing on the Nasserist precedent of turning attention outward, and on his
own flair for dramatic preemptive moves, Sadat announced to a stunned Peo-
ple's Assembly that he would go to Jerusalem.58
While this and other such international political moves temporarily
diverted popular attention, domestic social and economic problems remained
unresolved. Like Nasser before him, Sadat tended to rely on international affairs
to revive domestic support, and in this realm he did enjoy several successes. But
the waves of popularity which followed the 1973 war, the journey to Jerusalem,
and the 1979 peace treaty were all short-lived. In each case raised expectations
were unmet, resulting in deep frustration. This was particularly serious after the
formula linking peace with prosperity failed to produce the latter. The already
noted social and economic problems simply became that much more glaring in
the context of dashed hopes. By 1980, Egypt's domestic crisis and public disil-
lusionment steadily eroded Sadat's legitimacy, a process which was completed
with his resort to mass arrests and repression.
Turning to Mubarak, we find that he has relied on the politics of con-
tainment and, when necessary, coercion in order to maintain his government.
Unlike Nasser and Sadat, however, he is less inclined toward dramatic moves on
the international stage. The absence of such gestures generated little enthusiasm
for Mubarak's rule and allowed festering domestic issues to assume their real
importance. Yet Mubarak did have a strategy: in both domestic and international
affairs, Mubarak emphasized reconciliation.59 On the domestic front, this
entailed direct meetings with opposition figures, including pardoning and
receiving at the presidential palace many who were imprisoned under Sadat. In
foreign affairs, Mubarak's slow and methodical diplomacy has had none of the
dramatic successes of Nasser or Sadat; but neither has it resulted in any grand
failures. Under Mubarak, Egypt maintained its relatively cold peace with Israel
while also ending its period of ostracism in Arab regional politics. Almost
immediately upon assuming the presidency, Mubarak set to work mending
fences with the same Arab and Islamic leaders whom Sadat had publicly called
"dwarfs". Largely as a result of Mubarak's quiet diplomatic efforts, Egypt was
readmitted to the Organization ofthe Islamic Conference in 1987, and in 1989
attended its first Arab League summit since its expulsion ten years earlier. By
the 1990s, the headquarters of the Arab League had returned to Cairo. In sum,
Mubarak's diplomacy restored Egypt to its place in the Arab, African, and
Islamic worlds, and deepened its military and economic relationship with the
United States.̂ O
Mubarak's presidency therefore marked a departure from Nasser's and
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Sadat's proclivities for dramatic actions in international affairs. As a result, his
foreign policy maneuvers have not had the same diversionary effects as those of
his predecessors. The consequence of this has been even more critical scrutiny
of his domestic policies and of Egypt's many socio-economic problems.
Mubarak's low-key forays into international affairs may reveal a declining utili-
ty for this diversionary tactic in contemporary Egypt. Nonetheless, his dull-but-
consistent successes may have built for the regime a reputation for competence,
if not charisma, in foreign affairs.
COMPARING SURVIVAL STRATEGIES ACROSS
THE THREE REGIMES
Containment Compared
In sum, each of the presidencies examined here shows a consistent pat-
tern in attempting to contain pressures to its rule, with significant variations in
tactics. The overuse of a tactic has, in fact, often limited its utility for the suc-
cessor government. In Nasserist Egypt, containment strategies involved estab-
lishing corporatist structures designed to encompass virtually the entire society.
Where centers of power were too great to be contained in this manner, Nasser
turned instead to containment through balancing such centers as the military and
the ASU against one another. For Sadat, the purging of Nasserist elements in the
state involved the dismantling of corporatist structures whose utility may have
already eroded along with their legitimacy in the public eye.
To recapture public support and contain burgeoning pressures for plu-
ralism in post-Nasserist Egypt, Sadat turned instead toward political and eco-
nomic liberalization. Yet the effort to contain pressures through political liberal-
ization under Sadat and later Mubarak as well, met with considerable public
cynicism (largely as a result of unfulfilled expectations regarding the scope of
"democratization"). That cynicism was well-founded, as both Sadat and
Mubarak appeared to see democratization less as a means of extending the base
of political participation, and more as a way of containing opposition to their
rule.6i
Repression Compared
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all turned to repression of dissent, when
various maneuvers intended to contain social and political pressures had proven
ineffective. The case of Nasser's Egypt, however, illustrates the unfortunate ten-
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dency for the resort to violent coercion and repression to build on itself, to the
point that it may develop into a strategy of the first instance rather than one of
last resort. While the development of the Nasserist repressive apparatus appears
to fit this model, the Sadat administration first broke with this pattern, only to
return to it in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the regime was most
besieged. Under Mubarak, Egypt opened up considerably, with a much shorter
shadow of repression than before, although the use of coercion against dissi-
dents by no means disappeared. In essence, the Mubarak strategy toward its
most vocal opposition—the Islamists—amounted to one of "divide and rule" by
containing moderate oppositionists (including the mainstream lkhwan) while
violently repressing more militant Islamists.
By the late 199O's, however, the regime was decidedly on the defen-
sive, and by continuing to concentrate on the perceived Islamist threat to the
regime's survival, the image of the Mubarak presidency remained for many
Egyptians one of a besieged government whose policies on social and economic
development amounted to running in place and little more. Yet Egyptians them-
selves were also divided in their attitudes toward the continued battles between
the military-backed secular state and its Islamist opponents. For some, the previ-
ously unthinkable idea of an Islamic Republic of Egypt seemed a worthwhile
experiment after almost half a century of rule by the Free Officers and their
descendants. For others, however, the spectacle of chaos and civil war in Algeria
in the 199O's served to rally otherwise liberal elements behind the semi-authori-
tarian state in its efforts against Islamism.
External Diversion Compared
Nasser and Sadat diverted domestic attention toward dramatic Egyptian
involvement in regional and global affairs. Mubarak, by contrast, eschewed such
maneuvers in terms of his tactics (and diversionary power), but he by no means
rejected Egypt's activist role in international affairs. The regime, for example,
played a key role in assembling the Arab component of the U.S.-led coalition
against Iraq in 1990-91. And in terms of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the
Mubarak regime had carved out its place in the process as virtually the only par-
ticipant whom all the antagonists could talk to. But this type of foreign policy
involvement never quite approached the drama of the Nasser or Sadat eras, and
hence never amounted to a real diversionary tactic for the regime.
Diversion through manipulating the international involvement of one's
government is a maneuver found in many countries in addition to Egypt. This
may be an even more feasible route for governments in developing countries
which, like Egypt, are considered to be of high geopolitical importance by vari-
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ous "great powers". It is important to note, however, that while useful in a short
term sense, this domestic-international linkage is at best highly precarious in the
long term, as domestic social and economic problems remain even after the dust
has settled from the latest international crisis.
CONCLUSIONS
By examining strategies of survival, this paper has explored the dura-
bility of governments in republican Egypt since 1952. It has emphasized the
utility of three general strategies, all of which exploit options that are subject to
manipulation by political leaders, and all of which have implications for under-
standing four decades of relative political stability and regime durability in
Egypt, as well as understanding similar phenomena in other executive-centered
countries throughout the "Third World". Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak have been
quite consistent in their attempts to contain, repress, and divert political pres-
sures.
Thus each Egyptian president succeeded in consolidating his own
power and developing the presidency as an institution, yet none succeeded in
developing state institutions beyond the presidency. Each has reshuffled the
make-up of organizations and agencies, but none has institutionalized major
organizations and agencies in the strict sense of the term. As Migdal has argued,
"keeping state leaders afloat may paradoxically have involved the systemic
weakening of the state's agencies, a kind of de-institutionalization."62 This is
well-illustrated in the experience of Nasser's ASU, and in the later failures of
both Sadat and Mubarak to follow through with true democratization and mean-
ingful participatory politics.
Mubarak's great contribution to the development of Egypt might have
been in breaking with this cynical pattern and pursuing a more genuine process
of democratization. After the first ten years of his presidency, Mubarak had
indeed pursued relatively more democratization than his predecessors, and rela-
tively less repression. Yet his battle with Islamist militancy ran against the over-
all trend toward greater political liberalization, so that the survival strategies dis-
cussed above continued to dominate Egyptian political life. The danger is that
the lack of development of state institutions, of political legitimacy, and of sta-
ble and effective means for real political participation help to perpetuate the
basic insecurity of the regime and to limit its overall policy effectiveness. Most
Third World countries are already confronted by a host of economic, social,
demographic, and even environmental problems and obstacles to development.
These hurdles, combined with weak state institutions and insecure leadership.
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encourage executives to pursue short term survival strategies to a greater extent
than long term development strategies. The result is a vicious cycle of short term
survival strategies perpetuating the conditions for still more of the same.
Excessive reliance on the types of survival strategies discussed here
bodes ill for the development prospects of many countries in the Third World.
As this paper has demonstrated, a leader such as Nasser or Sadat may have a
great vision, agenda, or ideological view aimed at change and development of
the nation, yet the focus on government survival can easily become an obses-
sion, tempering even the most ambitious plans for a better future. Political con-
centration on the short term and the immediate future all too easily loses sight
of lasting development, with the result that executives may survive but the ulti-
mate losers continue to be the people.
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